Randall Larsen’s 70-20-10 solution

In the May 25 issue of the Wall Street Journal, Randall Larsen, a homeland security expert and former air force colonel, takes aim at the notion now gaining popularity in Congress of requiring 100% inspection of containers entering the United States. To mix a few metaphors, Mr. Larsen’s argument is a house of cards built upon a foundation of sand. It can’t stand up to the wind blowing and if it could, the tide is quickly coming in.

Mr. Larsen’s argument shows he simply does not understand the first thing about scanning technology. As he writes, “Even if terrorists were to put a nuke in a container, don’t you suppose they’d also be smart enough to put lead around it? This makes a Hiroshima bomb virtually undetectable by screening.” The scanning technologies for nuclear weapons and dirty bombs work in two different ways. Passive systems detect radiation being emitted by the weapon. Active systems use different parts of the electro-magnetic spectrum to detect the density of objects being scanned. Used in concert, as they are in a highly successful prototype in Hong Kong, they can detect radiation being emmitted or lead being used to shield the source.

Mr. Larsen also suggests that in addition to the technology being ineffective, the cost would be prohibitive if all containers were scanned. Moreover, he argues this money should be spent elsewhere on more effective programs. This is based on the false assumption that the US government and American taxpayers would foot the bill. In the above mentioned Hong Kong pilot, it has been the shipping industry that has picked up the tab. The industry as a whole is willing to invest in the scanning technology and back endy systems to screen 100% of all containers bound for the US and send these images to US Customs and Border Protection to be analyzed. Such a system would allow a threat to be identified well before it reaches our shores. Under the current system, a nuclear weapon could be detonated in a major seaport well before Customs agents would have the opportunity to inspect it.

What the shippers are asking for in return is the so-called “green lane” — in exchange for this investment they want containers under the program to be given expedited entry once they reach US shores.
Instituting this program would cost the US a minimal amount. Doing it on a voluntary basis would avoid what Mr. Larsen and his ilk really fear, anything that looks like regulating security in the private sector.

Mr. Larsen’s 70-20-10 plan relies almost entirely (70% of it anyway) on investing in securing nuclear materials at the source. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done. Many sovereign states are not amenable to US efforts to control their nuclear stockpiles and programs. Russia, North Korea, Pakistan and Iran come to mind. On the other hand, we have willing partners in AP Moeller, Maersk and Hutchinson Wampoa, companies that together operate most of the ports in the world. In the end, Mr. Larsen is objecting to a program that would dramatically improve the level of security for one of our largest vulnerabilities at almost no cost to the US taxpayer.